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Time for
More Stimulus
s the green shoots of economic recovery that many people spied
this spring have turned brown, questions are being raised as to
whether the policy of jump-starting the economy through a
massive fiscal stimulus has failed. Has Keynesian economics
been proven wrong now that it has been put to the test?
That question, however, would make sense only if
Keynesian economics had really been tried. Indeed, what is
needed now is another dose of fiscal stimulus. If that does not
happen, we can look forward to an even longer period in which the economy operates
below capacity, with high unemployment.
The Obama administration seems surprised and disappointed with high and rising job-
lessness. It should not be. All of this was predictable. The true measure of the success of
the stimulus is not the actual level of unemployment, but what unemployment would
have been without the stimulus. The Obama administration was always clear that it would
create some three million jobs more than what would otherwise be the case. The problem
is that the shock to the economy from the financial crisis was so bad that even Obama’s
seemingly huge fiscal stimulus has not been enough.
But there is another problem: In the United States, only about one-quarter of the
almost $800 billion stimulus was designed to be spent this year, and getting it spent even
on “shovel ready” projects has been slow going. Meanwhile, U.S. states have been faced
with massive revenue shortfalls, exceeding $200 billion. Most face constitutional require-
ments to run balanced budgets, which means that such states are now either raising taxes
or cutting expenditures—a negative stimulus that offsets at least some of the Federal gov-
ernment’s positive stimulus. 
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It’s do or die.
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At the same time, almost one-third of the stimulus was
devoted to tax cuts, which Keynesian economics correctly
predicted would be relatively ineffective. Households, bur-
dened with debt while their retirement savings wither and
job prospects remain dim, have spent only a fraction of the
tax cuts.
In the United States and elsewhere, much attention was
focused on fixing the banking system. This may be neces-
sary to restore robust growth, but it is not sufficient. Banks
will not lend if the economy is in the doldrums, and American
households will be particularly reluctant to borrow—at least
in the profligate ways they borrowed prior to the crisis. The
almighty American consumer was the engine of global
growth, but it will most likely continue to sputter even after
the banks are repaired. In the interim, some form of govern-
ment stimulus will be required.
Some worry about America’s increasing national debt.
But if a new stimulus is well designed, with much of the
money spent on assets, the fiscal position and future growth
can actually be made stronger.
It is a mistake to look only at a country’s liabilities, and
ignore its assets. Of course, that is an argument against badly
designed bank bailouts, like the one in America, which has
cost U.S. taxpayer hundreds of billions of dollars, much of it
never to be recovered. The national debt has increased, with
no offsetting asset placed on the government’s balance sheet.
But one should not confuse corporate welfare with a
Keynesian stimulus. 
A few (not many) worry that this bout of government
spending will result in inflation. But the more immediate
problem remains deflation, given high unemployment and
excess capacity. If the economy recovers more robustly than
I anticipate, spending can be canceled. Better yet, if much of
the next round of stimulus is devoted to automatic stabiliz-
ers—such as compensating for the shortfall in state rev-
enues—then if the economy does recover, the spending will
not occur. There is little downside risk.
Nevertheless, there is some concern that growing infla-
tionary expectations might result in rising long-term interest
rates, offsetting the benefits of the stimulus. Here, monetary
authorities must be vigilant, and continue their “non- standard”
interventions—managing both short-term and long-term
interest rates.
All policies entail risk. Not preparing for a second stim-
ulus now risks a weaker economy—and the money not being
there when it is needed. Stimulating an economy takes time,
as the Obama administration’s difficulties in spending what it
has allocated show; the full effect of these efforts may take a
half-year or more to be felt.
A weaker economy means more bankruptcies and home
foreclosures and higher unemployment. Even putting aside
the human suffering, this means, in turn, more problems for the
financial system. And, as we have seen, a weaker financial
system means a weaker economy, and possibly the need for
more emergency money to save it from another catastrophe. If
we try to save money now, we risk spending much more later.
The Obama administration erred in asking for too small
a stimulus, especially after making political compromises
that caused it to be less effective than it could have been. It
made another mistake in designing a bank bailout that gave
too much money with too few restrictions on too favorable
terms to those who caused the economic mess in the first
place—a policy that has dampened taxpayers’ appetite for
more spending.
But that is politics. The economics is clear: the world
needs all the advanced industrial countries to commit to
another big round of real stimulus spending. This should be
one of the central themes for G20 policymakers. ◆
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